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a b s t r a c t   
 
Cities around the world are under pressure from population growth, frenetic global economic restructur - 
ing, and climatic perturbations. Some, like London, attract an excess of speculative, momentum or tax -
informed inward investment to ﬁnance their intensiﬁcation. Provincial towns, on the other hand, which 
sustain extractive metropolii, can wither without capital or talent. Sensible planning and cali - brated 
regional investment is the antidote to polarisation but confronts an apparent ‘smart’ or ‘sustain - able’ 
conundrum. Grandiose, technical megaprojects like Songdo or Masdar cities and sprawling, 
disconnected estates are an anathema. We articulate a putative smart and sustainable solution (‘ smart-
SUR’) with ‘institutional’, ‘project’ and innovative ‘funding’ components and explore mega-urban 
regeneration projects in the UK and Holland. Smart-SUR has geographical, procedural and teleological 
aspects. Its mechanism involves local engagement, institutional strengthening, tight project screening 
and innovative regenerative funding. Its outcome are inclusive, measured, and coordinated 
transformations which ‘sweat’ existing assets, counter the long-tail of educational failure, and catalyse 
productive local innovation. 
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In coming decades, (Floater, Rode, Friedel, & Robert Steering, 
2014) conurbations confront unprecedented growth with internal 
and external challenges in the maelstrom of the ‘infernal machine’ 
(Bordieu, 1998: 100). Cataclysmic events like war, tsunamis or vol- 
canic eruptions are dramatic examples of external threats. When 
Santorini erupted in the second millennium BC, it destroyed 
Akrotiri, and wiped out Minoan coastal settlements on Crete. In 
79AD, Vesuvius buried Pompeii. Unlike the  contiguous diffusion  
of pyroclastic ﬂows, in modern times disruptive technologies leap- 
frog and undermine encumbants. Detroit illustrates how poor 
management of technological disruption can tip a chronically 
stressed system into terminal decline. Besides war or acute geolog- 
ical and technology shocks, alterations to trade, culture, migration, 
rainfall or climate can all unsettle settlement status quo (Hall & 
Hesse, 2013; Hopkins, 2014). One response is to build new garden 
or other cities. When its Nile tributary silted-up, the entire city of 
Piramesse in Egypt was re-located (Bietak, 1981). 
As well as external perturbations,  cities  evolve  endogenously 
or they stagnate. Planning complacency, corruption or 
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underinvestment in civic and public amenities can jeopardise pro- 
gressive change. Poor management and diminished infrastructure 
can bequeath a toxic legacy of unstructured sprawl and pollution.  
In dystopic megacities, slums abut afﬂuent, gated enclaves and 
resentment breeds. Unstructured urbanization spillovers manifest 
in poor health, air pollution, trafﬁc congestion, psychologically 
stunted children and crime. Such spatial externalities  consume  
15% of Beijing’s GDP and cost the United  States  economy  US$ 
400 billion annually (Litman, 2014). The failure to tackle spatial 
and market externalities is neither ‘smart’ not ‘sustainable’. 
Sustainable prosperity impels inclusive and capable planning insti- 
tutions, focused on green infrastructure (Acemoglu & Robinson, 
2012; European Climate Foundation, 2010; Geltner &  de  
Neufville, 2014; Turner, 2014). Foresight, policy coordination and 
judicious interventions could shift current dystopic urban trajecto- 
ries towards more compact, connected, resilient and inclusive 
futures as a pre-requisite, but no guarantee of, eudemonic well-
being (Wadley, 2010). In contrast to hedonic well-being, the 
eudemonic focus is competence, autonomy and relatedness, not 
material tokens of status. 
Mega-projects like Songdago (Korea), Maasdar (UAE), Skolkovo 
(Russia) or Dongtan (China) are ‘unlikely to deliver widespread, 
lower level Maslovian sustainability (ibid.:19) and have high 
opportunity costs. Mega-projects are untamed political problems, 
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invoking contested information (Bruijn & Leijten, 2008. 
Operational risks include, fraud, cost escalation, cack-handed over- 
sight (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius, & Rothengatter, 2003a). Mega-project 
outcomes can underwhelm, polarise communities or rapidly 
depreciate. Less grandiose urban transformation, involve territorial 
foresight, debate, local engagement, institutional collaboration, 
project scrutiny and smart ﬁnance (Adair, Berry, Hutchinson, and 
McGreal, 2007; Güell & Redondo, 2012). For Batty (2013), social 
innovation resolves the ‘smart’ technical  or  social  paradox.  
Noting acute shocks, chronic stresses and contested futures  
visions, the research seeks a pathway for smart and sustainable 
urban regeneration (‘smart-SUR’) for eudemonic empowerment, 
which eschews proﬂigate mega-construction or debilitating laiss- 
esz faire. 
 
 
2. The problem 
 
In coming decades, most global growth will be urban (Floater   
et al., 2014) yet planning regimes in many conurbations seem curi- 
ously ill prepared to tackle looming internal and external chal- 
lenges in the maelstrom of the ‘infernal machine’ (Bordieu, 1998: 
100). The purpose of this paper is to articulate and substantiate a 
smart and Sustainable Urban Regeneration (‘smart-SUR’) frame- 
work with procedural and multiple teleological dimensions, cap- 
tured via smart institutions, quality projects, and innovative 
funding as illustrated in Fig. 1. Place-rooted and soundly adminis- 
tered, smart projects balance commercial with public realm con- 
siderations. The smart-SUR framework could help to inform 
resilience planning amidst the regional and local noise (Chorley 
and Haggett, 1965). It balances localism with informed transforma- 
tion for employment, aesthetics, logistics, or distributive  justice 
but it is tightly overseen and tempered by the rule of law. Site visits 
and grassroots consultation restrain excess and reﬁne transforma- 
tive goals for beautiﬁcation, pedestrian connectivity, waste man- 
agement, network connectivity, or ecological conservation. 
Urban threats and current urban policy ﬂux impel the smart-
SUR theoretical framework. An elaboration of the institu- tional, 
project and funding aspects of the putative model provided some 
discursive corroboration of its relevance as a screening tool for 
planners, developers, ﬁnanciers, or residents. Remote, sec- ondary 
data testing of the screening tool ﬂagged the need for site visits and 
grounded analysis, conducted for a regeneration project in Utrecht, 
Holland (see Figs. 2 and 3). 
 
3. Threats impelling a smart response 
 
Cities confront unprecedented internal and external challenges. 
Cataclysmic ones include war, tsunamis, or volcanic eruptions. 
When the Thera (Santorini) volcano erupted in the second millen- 
nium BC, it destroyed Akrotiri, and wiped out Minoan coastal set- 
tlements on Crete. In 79AD, Vesuvius buried Pompeii. Unlike the 
contiguous diffusion of pyroclastic ﬂows, in modern times disrup- 
tive technologies can leapfrog and undermine incumbent urban 
industries. Detroit illustrates how  inadequate  strategic  response 
to technological disruption can tip chronically stressed systems  
into decline. Besides war or acute geological and technology  
shocks, alterations to trade, culture, migration, rainfall, or climate 
can all unsettle settlement status quo (Hall & Hesse, 2013;  
Hopkins, 2014). The response to catastrophe varies with regime 
priorities and capabilities. When its Nile tributary silted-up, the 
entire city of Pi-Ramesses in Egypt was re-located (Bietak, 1981). 
Apart from dramatic external threats, constraints or endoge- 
nous forces can lead to dystopic urban trajectories and bequeath 
malignant outcomes, involving congestion or a toxic legacy of 
unstructured sprawl and pollution (e.g. Delhi in India). Dystopic 
megacities are characterised by planning complacency, poor man- 
agement, corruption, or underinvestment in civic and public 
amenities. Resentment breeds in slums that abut afﬂuent, gated 
enclaves. Unstructured urbanization spillovers manifest in poor 
health, air pollution, trafﬁc congestion, psychologically stunted 
children, and crime. Such spatial externalities consume 15% of 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Outline of putative smart-SUR conceptual framework, involving institutional, project and funding dimensions. Source: Authors (2014), adapted from Thomas et al. 
(2000), LópezLópez, Thomas, and Wang (2008), von Brown and Gatzweiler (2013) and Floater et al. (2014). Smart institutions presume sound macro policy at the national 
scale with policies to incentivise balanced development and correct market failure. At urban scale, the green ‘design’ aspect incorporates conservation of ‘natural capital’ and 
‘connectivity’. Technical progress and productivity sit within ‘efﬁciency’. ‘Spatial justice’ and ‘resilience’ addresses marginality and social exclusion. 
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Fig. 2. Utrecht Station Area Redevelopment (USARP) in the Netherlands plans to connect the station with the historical core. Source: Authors (2014). 
 
Beijing’s GDP and cost the United States economy US$ 400 billion 
annually (Litman, 2014). 
Clearly, the failure to tackle spatial or market externalities is 
neither ‘smart’ not ‘sustainable’. Smart-SUR seeks to internalise 
them and facilitate urban adaptation  for  sustainable  prosperity. 
Its constituents are foresight,  policy  coordination,  and well-
funded but judicious interventions. It impels capable plan- ning 
institutions, focused on more compact, connected, resilient, and 
inclusive futures as a pre-requisite, but no guarantee of, eude- 
monic well-being (Wadley, 2010). Rather than indiscriminate out- 
put or even hedonic well-being, the eudemonic focus is competence, 
autonomy and relatedness of citizens (Acemoglu & Robinson,  
2012; European Climate Foundation, 2010; Geltner and de 
Neufville, 2014; Turner, 2014). 
However, many obstacles block transformational change, nota- 
bly political disagreement, lack of funding and institutional weak- 
ness. Operational challenges include contested information (Bruijn 
& Leijten, 2008), fraud, cost escalation, or maladroit oversight 
(Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a). Obstacles aside, mega-project outcomes 
can underwhelm, polarise communities, or rapidly depreciate. 
Mega-projects like Songdo (Korea), Maasdar (UAE), Skolkovo 
(Russia) or Dongtan (China) have high opportunity costs and are 
‘unlikely to deliver widespread, lower level Maslovian sustainabil- 
ity’ (Wadley, 2010). To deliver these, Güell and Redondo (2012) call 
for a more tempered approach, involving territorial foresight, 
debate, local engagement, institutional collaboration, project scru- 
tiny, and smart ﬁnance. For Batty (2013), social innovation could 
resolve the ‘smart’ technological/grandiose or social/grounded 
paradox noting acute shocks, chronic stresses, regime malfunction, 
and contested futures visions, the rationale for the genesis of 
smart-SUR is clear. It could illuminate pathways for eudemonic 
empowerment that eschews proﬂigate mega-construction ‘white 
elephants’ or the worst depredations of debilitating laissez-faire. 
 
4. UK backdrop 
 
Having touched on smart-SUR deﬁnitional tension, place, and 
institutional complexity, we review aspects of the UK  backdrop  
and planning policy to ground the research. It presents a mixed 
picture with bleak, quasi-Dickensian, or Panglossian 
interpretations. 
4.1. Panglossian narrative 
 
Arguably, more so than in France, English planners have tem- 
pered the worst depredations of industrial blight and sprawl but 
strangled housing supply. Despite polarisation and policy disconti- 
nuity, some remarkable regeneration projects have transformed 
cities like Liverpool, Manchester, and Glasgow (Talon, 2010).  
Iconic projects notwithstanding, British housing markets remain 
starkly segregated. Despite demographically induced intensiﬁca- 
tion pressures, pockets of deprivation persist (Meen, 2009). To 
eliminate them, the Urban Task Force (1999) made over 100 rec- 
ommendations, including design excellence, brownﬁeld develop- 
ment, and higher densities. One billion (£) of public investment 
and tax incentives supported urban renaissance (DETR, 2000; 
S. Huston et al. / Cities 48 (2015) 66–75 69 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Construction of pedestrian and cycling walkways for Utrecht Station Area Redevelopment (USARP) in the Netherlands. Source: Authors (2014). 
 
Colomb, 2007). Schemes such as the Community Development 
Projects or the Neighbourhood Renewal Strategies targeted 
deprived areas to attenuate territorial injustice. 
 
 
4.2. Quasi-Dickensian narrative 
 
On the other hand, massive injections of public funds for the 
Olympics, Cross-Rail, and Kings Cross regeneration were arguably 
less spatially progressive. Whilst the London  Plan  (Greater 
London Authority, 2011) identiﬁed ‘polarisation’ (ibid. s1.27) and 
paid lip service to ‘promote equality and tackle deprivation’ (ibid. 
s4.61), for Edwards (2009), Kings Cross regeneration was ‘essen- 
tially a business activity aimed at growth and competiveness.’ 
Despite supposed ‘extensive ‘‘consultation,’’ local communities felt 
disenfranchised’. Locals were ‘endlessly listened to’ but had ‘no 
detectable power to determine the  outcome’  (ibid.  23).  
Regionally, UK planning is administration presents a confused jum- 
ble of district, county, or local tiers to frustrate coherent national 
housing supply. Local resentment centres on the authoritarian 
imposition of geographically mal-adapted housing targets. 
Privileged locales articulate objections most strongly. For Piketty 
(2014)Piketty (2014) the root cause of UK polarisation is the 
wasteful economy of ‘patrimony’. Instead of treating the root  
causes of capital’s concentration and malignancy, the regime tin- 
kers intermittently with its symptoms.  Rather  than  progressive 
tax reforms to curtail evasion or speculative excess, policy ﬂuctu- 
ates electorally within a media circus. Robust educational reform 
falters in the face of entrenched inequality, ministerial posturing, 
and departmental managerialism or chronic  ineptitude.  
Nationally, London’s economic dominance festers, undermining 
affordability and destabilising long-term productivity growth. 
Regionally, distinctive adjacent towns like Gloucester and 
Cheltenham reﬂect atavistic class divisions. Notwithstanding a 
charade of contrived ‘festivals’, status differentials (rooted in  
wealth and housing inequity) fracture local communities and 
undermine authentic ‘dwelling’ (Heidegger, 1954; Seamon, 2000). 
In the populist imagination, rogue landlords exploit an impecu- 
nious and unskilled underclass of renters on zero hour contracts 
who, in desperation, turn to unscrupulous payday lenders. In stark 
contrast, the bourgeoisie relish status, overpriced dwellings, tro- 
phy wives, outlandish vehicles, or designer baubles. In this extrac- 
tive narrative, corruption, cronyism, and ﬁnancial malpractice 
enrich not enterprise or effort. 
 
 
4.3. Conclusion 
 
A balanced assessment of the UK built environment backdrop 
sits between the extreme narratives but wealth inequality remains 
troubling. The richest 10% of the population controls 44% of the 
nation’s total wealth. In contrast, the poorest half of the population 
subsists on 9%  of  the  resources  (Lucchino  &  Morelli,  2012;  
ONS, 2014). Current UK government urban policy is investment-
orientated and growth-focused with somewhat less concern for 
authentic community engagement and distributive justice (Rawls, 
1971). Policy ﬂux  and  factional wrangling has  left   a muddle and a 
bewildering confusion of policy levers: 
 
Local Growth Fund (LGF), available for Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs). 
● The Growing Places Fund (GPF). 
● Regional Growth Fund (RGF) Infrastructure Guarantees. 
● Public Works Loan Board (PWLB). 
● Enterprise Zones (EZs). 
● Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL). 
To conclude, the admittedly eclectic, review of UK policy con- 
text revealed two opposing euphoric or gloomy narratives but 
impels a considered planning mechanism to address invidious 
aspects of spatial and  social  malignancy  without  undermining  
the rule of law or sparking nefarious unintended consequences. 
● 
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5. Smart institutions 
 
Having touched on the external and internal risks, policy mud- 
dle, and polarisation that impel smart-SUR, we now elaborate on 
the ﬁrst of its three pillars. Smart institutions should foster quality 
growth and curtail its extractive modes. Requirements include a 
futures orientation towards resilience and creativity, sensible spa- 
tial architecture, and disposition towards collaboration. In contrast 
to extractive ones, smart institutions seek to remedy, not exploit 
market failures and attenuate, not reinforce structural inequalities 
(Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). Unlike in comprador capitalism, 
smart urban development is accountable, people-focused, and con- 
serves natural systems (Thomas, 2000). It taps new online tech- 
nologies and geographical data to capture, model, or visualise 
projects that inform planning and negotiations. Collaborative 
interplay begins with appropriate scales (boundaries) and tight 
institutional ﬁt (design). Proper governance reduces ﬁnancial 
manipulation or ﬁscal distortion and incentivises projects with 
conservation, education, or health spinoffs. Inclusive institutions, 
authentic debate, subsidiarity, and the rule of law temper extrac- 
tive proclivities. Smart collaborative institutions negotiate or mud- 
dle through (Lindblom, 1959) but avoid the quagmire of strategic 
drift. Integrity, foresight, and competence, enable them to screen, 
plan and execute quality projects for urban resilience or enterprise. 
Resilient settlements can better absorb disturbance or reorganise  
to retain function, structure, and identity (Forbes & et al., 2009; 
Holling, 1973). Redundancy and a balance of  social,  economic,  
and environmental capital strengthen it (Wilson, 2014). Just as 
genetic predisposition, trauma exposure, or informed treatment 
engender psychological resilience (Rutter, 1985) so too, urban resi- 
lience invokes planning (smart institutions), selective regeneration 
(quality projects) and system upgrade funding (von Braun & 
Thorat, 2014). Smart institutions employ competent and coopera- 
tive staff to generate useful output with positive social and ecolog- 
ical spillovers (Rogers, 2012; Turner, 2014). Productivity gains 
come without energy or carbon intensiﬁcation. Rather, efﬁciency 
gains come from distributed energy, transport, and information 
networks. 
5.1. Foresight 
 
A smart response to multiple urban challenges begins with the 
articulation of purpose (to engineer resilience or foster creativity). 
The next step is to collect useful intelligence to understand places 
(Floater et al., 2014) and to celebrate their distinctive historicity, 
heritage, or landscapes. Informed spatial transformations (out- 
comes) rely on science or architectural and design excellence but 
need grounded urban intelligence. Archival research, baseline anal- 
ysis, expert views, and structured stakeholder engagement help 
understand place character (ambience and atmosphere). 
Comprehensive site diagnostics informs smart institutions on rele- 
vant, scientiﬁc, commercial, and local concerns about contamina- 
tion or disruptive intensiﬁcation (habitat loss, blight, noise, 
emissions, congestion, or service stress). In smart cities, decision-
support or geographical technologies help stakeholders visualise 
alternate project permutations to evaluate architectural, 
connectivity, spatial justice, and ecological impacts. 
 
5.2. Institutions 
 
Smart planning institutions are properly articulated (scale and 
scope) and governed. Strategic leadership, governance, and institu- 
tional architecture help assure effective, efﬁcient, inclusive, and 
transparent project management. They balance strategic foresight 
and ‘top down’ leadership (Hemphill, Berry, & McGreal, 2004) with 
local dialogue. Inspired by the common good, smart planning 
interventions seek to attenuate spatial injustice without under- 
mining customary or bona ﬁde formal property rights or cultural 
practices. Top-down leadership and vision drives strategic trans- 
formation of urban environments (Freedman, 2014)  but  smart-
SUR is reﬂexive and democratic. It may even reject transfor- 
mation and intensiﬁcation in favour of preservation or conserva- 
tion. Smart-SUR’s institutional culture is ‘managerialist’ in the 
sense that it eschews spectacle and seeks long-term solutions to 
substantive economic and social problems (Harvey, 1989). 
Governance ensures legitimate and cost-effective delivery of com- 
plex projects (Termeer, Dewulf, & van Lieshout, 2010). It comprises 
the formal policies, procedures, and informal culture and norms to 
focus corporate activity and attenuate agency problems (corrup- 
tion, nepotism or ‘free-riding’). 
Pragmatism and diplomacy helps institutions navigate com- 
plexity and local power politics or  vested  interests.  Institutional 
ﬁt, good governance and authentic consultation mitigates the risk 
of outlandish projects, fanciful projections, and cost blowouts.  
Tight governance, ﬁnancial transparency, and proper tendering 
cuts waste and roots out corruption or nepotism. It increases com- 
petition and broadens private participation in critical infrastruc- 
ture. Its antithesis is ‘patrimony’, oligopolistic free riding, and 
‘plutocratic dystopia (Piketty, 2014). Brazil’s World Cup stadium 
construction projects fail to pass muster against the subsidiarity, 
spatial justice and transparency criteria but even in tight institu- 
tional settings, misconstrued purpose, project complexity or mar- 
ket turbulence can scupper performance (Altshule & Luberoff, 
2003; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003a; Van Marrewijk, Clegg, Pitsis, & 
Veenswijk, 2008). Flyvbjerg, Holm, and Buhl (2003b) found that 
nine out of ten projects went over budget with typical costs blow- 
outs of around one third. 
Institutional design and partnership management facilitate pro- 
ject delivery. Proper spatial, temporal and functional ﬁt help con- 
ﬁgure institutional and network  architecture  to  match  
operational requirements. Ekstrom and Young (2009) note that 
misﬁt occurs when institutional arrangements ignore ecosystem 
character, function and dynamics. Spatially, cross-scale misﬁt 
occurs where anthropogenic administrative or organisational 
boundaries diverge from bio-geophysical ones. Catchment man- 
agement and water security problems are typical. Temporally, 
urban decision-makers can have a short-term, electoral focus. 
Functionally, nested organisational concerns can overwhelm fore- 
sight or collaboration. 
To conclude, the institutional literature supports its incorpora- 
tion within smart-SUR’s to mitigate uneven geographical develop- 
ment. Its constituents are strategic foresight and well-functioning 
and tightly ﬁtting institutions, orientated towards resilient and 
creative futures. Institutional constraints involve skills, technology, 
ﬁnance, vested interests, collaborative silos, spatial data, and com- 
munity alienation or fragmentation (Talon, 2010). 
 
6. Project quality 
 
Urban regeneration quality considerations are  multi-faceted  
but include architecture, design, and public realm, or connective 
infrastructure like sky trains or rail tunnels for compact or con- 
nected cities (Floater et al., 2014). In terms of place-making, the 
‘smart’ solution confronts meaning ambiguity, ‘place’ complexity, 
and institutional diversity. Places are not two-dimensional but 
complex constructs with multiple agent network interactions. 
Institutionally, traditional planners confront alternate policy foci 
(ﬁrm competitiveness, local health, school operation). Clashes 
between conceptual frameworks and legitimising rationales are 
commonplace (Healey, 2007). The rapidly evolving global economy 
accentuates stakeholder tensions. The demise of Deepdene palazzo 
and its demolition in 1967 to make way for drab ofﬁces in Dorking 
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provides a salutatory example of crass commercial land transfor- 
mation, bereft of local place sensitivity and without national policy 
coherence (Jakobsen & Høvig, 2014; Robinson, 2012). Even sophis- 
ticated hedonic models which isolate interior, exterior or urban-
scale quality design components that add commercial value would 
not prevent such planning mistakes (Nase, Berry, & Adair, 2013), 
reinforcing the need for balanced assessment instruments such as 
smart-SUR. 
 
7. Innovative funding models 
 
The third pillar for smart-SUR is viable public or private funding 
model. The current commodiﬁed ﬁscal regime can undermine 
forward-thinking investments like Transport Orientated 
Developments (TOD) or canal restoration projects with land amal- 
gamation or complex planning, geotechnical and construction 
issues (Searle, Darchen, & Huston, 2014). Hence, political and busi- 
ness cycles, public ﬁnances, or market conditions shape or con- 
strain transformation viability. Capital and space market 
intelligence can detect turning points which can alter project 
ﬁnancial viability. In due course, gentriﬁcation can mediate  
adverse market conditions and unlock commercial potential of eth- 
nic locales as seen with Brixton in London. However, whilst com- 
mercial or subsidised viability is necessary it is not the sole 
consideration for smart-SUR (Brookes, 2013; Vanolo, 2014). 
One innovative source of ﬁnance is to capture the uplift in 
development land values, induced by train, ferry, or street con- 
struction/beautiﬁcation. The mechanism can be either direct (lease 
charges or infrastructure connection fees) or indirect, via higher 
tax. To tax land uplift increments, ﬁrst designate the beneﬁcial, 
value-capture project hinterland and then assign collection rights  
to the project proponent, usually, a special purpose vehicle (SPV). 
The SPV clariﬁes project ownership, allocates responsibilities, costs 
risks, and orchestrates construction. The associated funding model 
structures stakeholder rights, conditions, disbursements and 
repayment proﬁles and ﬁrms-up proponent  relative  risk  proﬁle. 
To assess their risk exposure, investors scrutinise projects looking 
at SPV capability and funding credibility, site position, land amal- 
gamation, project marketability, and government support. 
Theoretically, due-diligence should weed out bad urban infrastruc- 
ture projects, situated in unpromising sites with fanciful business 
models or weak government support. In practice,  projects,  like  
the Edinburgh tram system, are often delayed or over-budget 
(Easley & O’Hara, 2004). Smart-SUR rests on a credible corporate 
structures, strong public–private alliances, sound geographic con- 
text, and ﬁnancial credibility. Disruptive alternative ﬁnancing 
technologies like ‘crowd-funding’ and ‘digital currencies,’ such as 
Bitcoin, could revolutionise the sector. 
The private sector will only fund commercially viable urban 
regeneration so that investors can eventually recoup project outlays 
but, in the interim, get adequately compensated for the risks 
assumed. Compensation for risk reﬂects the opportunity cost of 
alternative investments foregone. In the public arena, positive 
public-realm or social improvement ‘spillovers’ can  compensate  
for a ﬁnancial deﬁcit. Where substantive public realm investment  
is necessary, a public–private partnership (PPP) can help (Pattberg 
& Widerberg, 2014) but private investors seek payback assurance 
and competitive returns for risk, in line with targets, assessment cri- 
teria, timescales and objectives (Adair et al., 2007). General tax 
levies aside, investor payback relies on the capture or internalisation 
of dispersed spatial beneﬁts to generate commercial revenue 
streams for the PPP. Alternatively, Social Impact Bonds (SIB) can 
raise ﬁnance (Finance for Good, 2014). In the SIB model, bondhold- 
ers not taxpayers initially bear risk defraying public disbursements. 
The SIB commissioning body (government) only pays once auditors 
conﬁrm agreed and social or environmental milestones. 
Tax Increment Financing (TIF) provides another mechanism to 
capture ex-post project beneﬁt streams. Within TIF zones, 
recuperation of public real betterment costs is excised from local 
government and outsourced to the proponent himself. 
Infrastructure-induced property capital gains are ‘ring fenced’ to 
offset some of the initial upfront disbursements. In practice, TIF 
means the local authority effectively cedes element of its ﬁscal 
sovereignty to the proponent. 
Given collaboration complexity and repayment risk, smart-SUR 
must balance hegemonic idealism with self-determination, legal 
tradition, and policy settings. Public and ecological considerations 
temper commercial ones. Risk diagnostics inform the evaluation of 
its multiple success criteria. Whilst ideally smart-SUR management 
culture is administrative and collaborative not exploitative or indi- 
vidualistic, it still relies on investment and policy clarity, sound 
ﬁnancing and risk mitigation (Adair, Berry, McGreal, Dennis, & 
Hirst, 2000). Extensive information must be harvested on propo- 
nent capabilities (partnership institutionalisation, management, 
and solvency), project design, and capital market cyclical situation 
and space market prospects (planning regime, lease rates, and sales 
margins). Subsequently, risk analytics screens out ‘noise,’ inte- 
grates and structures data to tailor ﬁnancial projections, ascertain 
option values, estimate terminal yields, and ﬁne-tune capitalisa- 
tion rates. Funding reﬁnements sharpen information ﬁelds and 
ﬁne-tune risk assessment. Smart funding strategies can either be 
internally-focused, like multi-asset class factor models, or 
externally-oriented to cut information asymmetry (Diamond & 
Verrecchia, 1991). In the latter vein is a ‘smart beta’ strategy which 
scans for under-rated proponents/projects with stronger service 
debt capacity, higher returns or lower volatility prospects than 
conventional ﬁnancial metrics would suggest. Popular  industry  
risk and performance diagnostics include RiskMetrics; IPD real 
estate information; MSCI ESG (environmental, social and gover- 
nance), and ISS corporate governance research. 
To conclude, smart-SUR’s socially inclusive aspirations require 
proper due diligence around partnership structure and public or 
private funding models. In deprived areas, effective public realm 
enhancement is expensive. Outlays are either directly recouped 
from local beneﬁciaries or they are indirectly recovered from prox- 
imate or remote general taxation. 
Smart-SUR partnership effectiveness requires an agreed territo- 
rial vision and operational effectiveness. It calls for leadership, col- 
laboration, institutionalisation, and local legitimacy rooted in 
dialogue and community spatial spinoffs – jobs, health, convivial- 
ity, and spatial justice. Its long-term goals are urban ‘resilience’  
and community ‘creativity’ but its ethos is public-spirited, admin- 
istrative and policy-driven. However, multiple and lofty SUR aspi- 
rations load development costs on to projects in disadvantaged 
locales which can erode feasibility. Public funding aside, commer- 
cial counterweights are land-gifting, tax breaks, subsidies, project 
de-risking, or TIF. De-risking solutions involve corporate gover- 
nance, structured community dialogue and a robust payback  
model. In propitious locales, TIF or social infrastructure  bonds  
can provide alternate funding solutions. 
Given the stark distributional backdrop, ‘smart’ development 
must address, if not allocative minutia, then at least the broad pro- 
cedural mechanics for an inclusive society without compromising 
enterprise. Practically, SUR sidesteps pedantic semantic quarrels 
over ‘sustainability’ or statistical indicators for it, and instead backs 
catalyst projects for ‘high-quality city-based lifestyles with low 
carbon-based mobility’ (Banister, 2012). In this regard, pedestrian 
or dedicated cycle networks would pass muster (Southworth, 
2005). Table 1 gives some global regeneration examples, which 
enhance ‘hard’ infrastructure (built environment and transport 
logistics) but also address ‘soft’ institutional and spatial justice 
dimensions. Strategically diminished development undermines 
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Table 1 
Eclectic sample of global iconic regeneration transformations, illustrating ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ aspects. Source: Authors (2014). 
Project ‘Hard’/tangible investment ‘Soft’/Intangible 
 
Bordeaux Bordeaux Métropole Aménagement (France 1995–2007) Waterfront development Youth training heritage management 
Housing construction 
Public realm upgrades 
Tram system 
Paris Promenade Plantée (France 2000) Elevated  causeway and park Access to Bastille Opera 
Madrid Rio Manzanares (Spain 2006 a 2011) Riverfront remediation of Central 8 km green space, 
foot-bridges, and cycle routes 
Public plaza 
Job access to CBD 
San Francisco, Embarcadero (USA 1991) Demolition of ugly freeway Waterfront promenade 
Construction of palm-lined boulevard, squares and plazas New retail in public plaza 
Bogotá Juan Amarillo (Colombia 1990s) 45 km of greenway  and  300 km  bike lanes Job access to downtown 
Mass-transit system 
Seoul Cheonggyecheon (South Korea 2003–2005) Reclaimed river frontage Enhanced public transit 
Upgrades to local retail Pedestrian park amenity 
 
innovation capacity. Inequity, corruption, and mis-governance are 
its hallmarks. In contrast, smart remedies involve strategic leader- 
ship, organisation ﬁt, IT connectivity, and local up-skilling 
Table 2 
Summary of smart-SUR domains considered in mainstream project literature. Source: 
Authors (2014). 
 
 
(Colantonio & Dixon, 2010; Couch, 1990). For Roberts (2000), sus- 
tainable regeneration means realising a comprehensive vision 
Author (year) Smart 
institutions 
Quality 
projects 
Sustainable 
funding 
which makes ‘lasting improvement in the, economic, physical  
social and environmental conditions of an area.’ ‘Urban regenera- 
tion,’ like its utopian Garden Cities precedents (Howard, 1902), 
extends beyond narrow economic development or physical ‘urban 
renewal.’ Its proximate pragmatic physical, economic, or environ- 
mental upgrades improve the daily lives of ordinary  people.  
Within ﬁnancial constraints and realistic limits, sustainable regen- 
eration improves places, stimulates prosperity, and fosters inclu- 
sive   local   capabilities.   For   Turok   (1992:   361),   unrestrained 
1 
Freeman and Beale (1992) x x 
2 Savindo, Grobler, Parﬁtt, x 
Guvenis, and Coyle (1992) 
3 Turner (1993) x x x 
4 Munns and Bjeirmi (1996) x x 
5 Atkinson (1999) x x 
6 Chan and Chan (2004) x x 
7 Cox, Issa, and Aherns (2003) x x 
8 Westerveld (2003) x 
9     Phua (2004) x x 
market-led development fails to consider locals or underlying local 
economy  and  ‘may  have  detrimental  consequences  for  the  eco- 
nomic fabric of cities and for the quality of life of their residents.’ 
10 
Nguyen, Ogunlana, and Lan 
(2004) 
11 Hemphill, Berry and McGreal 
(2004) 
x x 
 
x x x 
We can split regeneration objectives into ‘hard’/tangible and 
‘soft’/intangible ones: 
 
‘Hard’ place and infrastructure upgrades (buildings, precincts, 
facilities, technology and logistics). 
‘Soft’ intangible investments to improve the environment 
(emissions control, remediation) or develop  human  capital  
(job creation, health programs, education and skills training, 
cultural activity, service provision). 
The sample of international regenerations projects substanti- 
ates the imperative for an evaluation tool to help navigate com- 
plexity, build consensus and overcome policy ﬂux. Smart-SUR 
could help focus stakeholders on long-term urban transformation 
goals, rectify organisational misﬁt and galvanise ﬁnance. It man- 
dates foresight, integrity, institutional ﬁt, local consultation, design 
ingenuity, construction expertise, and ﬁnancial acumen. Its trans- 
formative impacts target  connectivity,  productivity,  ecological  
and community resilience (De Wit, 1988). 
 
8. Remote investigations 
 
Having generated the smart-SUR framework, we investigated its 
plausibility against mainstream construction literature, as illus- 
trated in Table 2. 
The structured analysis of the construction literature supports 
the three smart-SUR pillars of smart institutions, quality projects 
and sustainable funding. 
Next, we investigated and evaluated one regional and ten 
London regeneration projects, rendering secondary data  within  
the smart-SUR framework. We scored each project against aspects 
of the smart-SUR institutional, project and funding domains using a 
ﬁve-point Likert scale. 
12 
Sohail and Baldwin (2004) x x x 
13 Low  and Chuan (2006) x x 
14 Wedding and Crawford-Brown x x x 
(2007) 
15 Winston (2010) x 
16 Shamas-ur-Rehman Toor and x 
Ogunlana (2008) 
17 Shamas-ur-Rehman Toor and x x 
Ogunlana (2009) 
 
 
 
 
However, when we populated the screening tool’s criteria with 
secondary data from web sites, e-Word of Mouth (blogs and social 
media) or project archival documentation, it could not adequately 
discriminate between projects. Table 3 illustrates the need for ﬁne-
grained primary data for proper urban regeneration project 
analysis. 
 
9. Site visit 
 
Finally, in May 2014, we conducted a site visit to Utrecht Station 
Area Redevelopment (USARP) project in the Netherlands as a prac- 
tical proving ground for smart-SUR. The 3 billion Euro project was 
conceived back in the 1990s but construction only started in 2007. 
The redevelopment seeks to intensify and rejuvenate an inner city 
area, enhance cycling and public transport access and improve per- 
meability between the old historical core and station precincts. 
Speciﬁc construction elements included a new railway station 
area, renewal of the Hoog Cathrijne shopping mall and  upgrades  
to pedestrian walkways as well as renovation of Catharijnesingal 
Canal. The site visit involved several rounds  of  interviews  with  
key USARP stakeholders to discuss critical success factors and pro- 
ject bottlenecks. We found that managing diverse and multiple 
stakeholders accentuated an already complex project. USARP 
● 
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Smart 
aspect 
Smart institutions Smart projects Smart funding 
ack 
ng 
 
Table 3 
Results of UK urban regeneration project desktop screening with Smart-SUR with secondary-data (shaded to distinguish framework domains). Source: Authors (2014). 
 
 
Attribute Intell 
igenc 
e 
Resil 
ience 
Crea 
tivity 
Gove 
rnan 
ce 
Scale Fit  Com 
muni 
ty 
Base 
line 
Geni 
us 
loci 
Desi 
gn 
Effici 
ency 
Justi 
ce 
Coll 
abor 
ation 
De- 
riski 
Payb 
Olympic 3 4 4 4 4  4 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 
Arsenal 3 4 2 3 3  3 3 3 2 2 4 4 3 3 3 
Wembley 3 4 3 3 3  3 4 3 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 
Greenwich 4 4 3 3 3  3 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 3 4 
Barking 3 4 3 3 3  3 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 
Nine elms 4 4 3 3 3  3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 4 
Kings                 
Cross 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 4 4 3 3 3 
Kidbrooke 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 4 3 3 3 
Wirral 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 2 3 4 4 3 2 4 
Canning 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 
 
interviews highlighted the problem of project evolution and inter- 
ference by diverse stakeholders with conﬂicting agendas. 
Stakeholder pressure and political serendipity forced ad-hoc 
amendments to an already complex project. At times, inﬂuenced  by 
short-term electoral and business cycles, government territorial 
foresight and long-term commitment wavered. Nevertheless, the 
project has survived  its  political and  budgetary travails. Now,  it  
is on track for completion in 2030. 
 
10. Discussion and conclusion 
 
We developed a smart-SUR conceptual framework with ‘institu- 
tional’, ‘project’ and innovative ‘funding’ components and corrobo- 
rated its plausibility by: 
 
Outlining the UK urban regeneration backdrop and polarised 
narratives. 
Assessing some iconic international projects. 
Conducting a structured review of the construction and project 
management literature. 
● Analysing secondary-data about signiﬁcant UK urban projects. 
● Investigating a mega urban regeneration project. 
Smart and sustainable urban regeneration (smart-SUR) provides 
a useful tool to screen urban regeneration projects. It involves both 
procedural and balanced multi-faceted teleological considerations 
(outcomes and impacts). In developing the framework, we found 
conﬂicted notions of ‘smart’ and ‘sustainable’. Urban regeneration 
extends beyond development and engineering efﬁciency in terms  
of time, cost, and project delivery. Sustainable urban regeneration 
projects build on local roots and aesthetic identity but are complex 
with multiple contested goals and high information costs. 
Betterment ideals are balanced by practical awareness of compet- 
ing foci and, hence, administrative complexity. SUR transforma- 
tional aspirations for urban realm enhancement or spatial equity 
must be balanced by a sober consideration of legal and planning 
process, impulses to self-determination,  entrepreneurship  and, 
not least, ﬁnancial viability. Smart partnership credibility and 
legitimacy is as important as ex-ante modelling of urban transfor- 
mational outcomes or functional impacts. Regeneration oversight 
extends to monitoring of partnerships output (policy, contracts), 
construction milestones, local transformative outcomes, and even- 
tual community impacts. Transformational outcomes  could 
include density, green-space, connectivity, affordable dwellings, 
energy use, waste, or ﬁnancial returns. Considered deliberation 
involves due consideration of heritage, cultural diversity, and ecol- 
ogy. Improvements should eventually translate into impacts like 
local inward investment, start-ups, jobs, or tax receipts, spatial 
housing justice, permeability (pedestrianisation, cycling, and pub- 
lic transport). Notwithstanding spatial resolution or temporal cut 
off, indicators of disease, poverty or crime should decline. In short, 
a regenerated community is more resilient, healthier, and more 
prosperous but three obstacles hinder the practical implementa- 
tion of smart-SUR. 
 
10.1. Common vision 
 
Except in authoritarian regimes, squabbling between stakehold- 
ers can delay, if not frustrate, the realisation of resilient or creative 
urban visions. Initially, politicians of different persuasion, planners 
in various tiers of government, fragmented local communities, 
small or large developers and local, remote, or online ﬁnanciers   
are unlikely to share a common vision. Tools to formulate common 
goals could include local surveys, Delphi approaches, focus groups 
or other negotiated solutions to untamed political problems. 
 
10.2. Partnership management 
 
The success of regeneration projects hinges on an effective part- 
nerships between multiple stakeholders who contest multi-
dimensional futures visions for eudemonic empowerment. Effective 
partnership management entails (1) leadership, (2) capa- bilities, 
(3) a budget or on-going ﬁnance (4) framework for conﬂict 
resolution. Governance and transparent reporting confer legiti- 
macy, demonstrate milestone delivery and facilitate adaptation. 
 
10.3. Finance 
 
Budgetary constraints or political and economic instability can 
delay or scupper regeneration. Neoliberalism, ﬁscal austerity, and 
pervasive corporate tax avoidance dampen socially inclusive aspi- 
ration and cut the public funding available for urban infrastructure. 
Private ﬁnance requires payback but its only source is developer 
charges or real estate taxes on ring-fenced beneﬁt streams. In 
imperfect property markets with weak ﬁscal tax regimes, spatial 
betterment inﬂates contiguous house prices but cack-handed com- 
mercial payback models fail to police or capture public realm  
uplifts or logistics beneﬁts. Without commensurate taxation of 
● 
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property capital gains, regeneration is regressive unless projects 
deliberately target deprived locales. In ﬂuctuating markets, an 
effective partnership between the public and private sector 
strengthens the commercial success of targeted projects. Private 
ﬁnance is constrained by the productive or predatory opportunity 
cost of capital. The vehicle for public sector support can vary but 
without it, for blighted districts in bearish markets, funding can 
evaporate. Strong public relations de-risking signals include propo- 
nent credibility, well-designed projects and structured community 
engagement for planning robustness. The London Plan (GLA, 2011) 
sent strong public relations de-risking signals to Olympic or King’s 
Cross investors. 
Our research makes four key contributions. First, it noted policy 
ﬂux and political vicissitudes, site and engineering challenges, 
blight or social deprivation all complicate public realm transforma- 
tion projects. Second, it postulated and investigated a smart-SUR 
multi-criteria framework to screen urban regeneration projects. 
Third, the research highlighted the limitations of secondary data  
for assessment. Documents, digital mapping, or street-view tech- 
nologies are commendable but ‘scuttlebutt’ investigations are nec- 
essary to capture ﬁne-grained institutional and site-speciﬁc 
regeneration issues. Smart-SUR project analysis invokes dialogue 
with diverse locals and experts, discussion with partners, process 
observation and audit of outputs, outcomes, and impacts. Finally, 
we stress the importance of stable and effective smart-SUR partner- 
ships. Unless contained by independent, scientiﬁc assessment and 
conﬂict resolution mechanisms, stakeholder wrangling can  delay 
or stop projects. On the other hand, autocratic project delivery 
without due reﬂection, tight oversight, or authentic local empow- 
erment can bequeath ‘white elephants,’ urban dysfunction, debt, 
and the poison chalice of civic corruption. 
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